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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
CASHIER'S CHECK-FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION-NON-LIABILITY OF BANK
-Oris 0. Kinder, plaintiff, acted as auctioneer in selling real estate for one
Schultz. The purchaser, one Edstom, gave Schultz a check of $500.00 as
down payment. Plaintiff and Schultz took the check to the bank after
closing hours, explaining to the acting cashier the circumstances under
which the check was made and that they wished to cash it so Schultz could
pay plaintiff his commission, the amount of which had been agreed upon.
The acting cashier explained to them that he could not cash the check as
it was after closing hours, but he could give cashier's checks to them in
consideration of Schultz endorsing the check of Edstom to the defendant
bank. This was done. Payment on Edstom's check was stopped and plain-
tiff sues the defendant bank upon the cashier's check. Held, that there
was a total failure of consideration. Judgment for defendant, affirmed.'
The probable majority of jurisdictions recognize a cashier's check
merely as an inland bill of exchange and subject to the same rules as
govern bills of exchange.2 The cases reaching the opposite result from
the principal case seem to be based upon the belief that a cashier's check
should be more than an ordinary check. The question has been settled in
some states by decisions and in at least one state by statute. 3 In that
state "all deposits not otherwise secured and all cashier's checks, certified
checks or sight exchange issued by banks operating under this law shall
be guaranteed by this act." A more moderate statement of the same rule
is that a cashier's check is not subject to countermand like an ordinary
check.4
Plaintiff in the principal case might be considered in some jurisdictions
as a holder in due course. Although he knew of the transactions which
gave rise to the execution of the cashier's check he apparently was not
guilty of any fraud in procuring the execution of it, and also was appar-
ently under the belief that the maker had executed it upon a valuable
consideration. These last two elements being true it would leave the plain-
tiff in the position of a bona Me purchaser of the note for value before
maturity.5
Another view contra to the one in the principal case is where cashier's
checks were issued at a depositor's request, it is to be "presumed" that
there was a consideration moving from the depositor to the bank, and the
want of consideration moving from the payee to the bank is immaterial.
It was further held that a bank, by issuing a cashier's check in reliance
upon the sufficiency of the balance or credit of the depositor, who requested
the issuance of the check, incurs a direct primary obligation to the payee
unless mere delivery of the notes be regarded as acquiescence, although the desira-
bility of the result is admitted. A note in 6 Univ. of Cin. L. Rev. 242 (1932)
objects to the case for the same reason.
'Kinder v. Fisher's Nat. Bank, Appellate Court of Indiana, Oct. 16, 1931,
177 N. E. 904.
2 Culter v. Repnolds (1872), 64 Ill. 321; People -v. Miller (1917), 278 Ill. 490,
116 N. E. 131; Duke v. rohnson (1923), 127 Wash. 601, 221 Fac. 321; Drinkall V.
Bank (1901), 11 N. D. 10, 88 N. W. 724, 57 L. n. A. 341.
3 Sec. 3596, Hemingway's Code (Miss.) ; Anderson -v. Bank (1924), 135 Miss.
351, 100 So. 179.
4 Krinkall v. Bank (1901), 11 N. D. 10, 88 N. W. 724, 57 L. It. A. 341.
5Gagle v. Lane (1887), 49 Ark. 465, 5 S. W. 790.
RECENT CASE NOTES
that the drawee would pay the checks on presentment, and in default
thereof that it would pay them.6 To say that the cashier's check was pre-
sumed to be given for a valuable consideration can mean only that con-
sideration is unnecessary. In the principal case such a presumption would
be based upon a false fact and it would only be justifiable to make such a
presumption if there were some public policy that demanded a cashier's
check to be an absolute promise to pay under and all conditions.
Many cases support the two views as stated.7 Their object in making a
cashier's check more than an ordinary inland bill of exchange is not with-
out merit but as seen by the facts in the principal case its application
would work a great hardship on innocent parties.
The view that supports the principal case may be stated that notes
are prima facie payment but the presumption upon which the contra cases
are based that the note was given in satisfaction of the debt may be
repelled and controlled by evidence that such was not the intention of
the parties, and this evidence may arise from the general nature of the
transaction, as well as from direct testimony to the fact.8 Such a rule
tends to give effect to the intention of the parties when entering into
the transaction and in the principal case, certainly, it could not be said
that the bank intended to incur direct liability on issuing its cashier's
check, even if the consideration failed nor would the payee in such circum-
stances as in the principal case expect the bank to make such an agreement.
To say that this plaintiff is a holder in due course is a very doubtful
statement.
The cashier's check being a negotiable instrument the defense made
by the defendant in the principal case is established by statute in Indiana.
As between original parties to a negotiable instrument failure of consid-
eration is a valid defense.9
J. D. W.
CORPORTIONS--INSOLVENGY-PROOF OF CLAIMS--X corporation, for a
valuable consideration, assumed all the liabilities of Y corporation. One
of these liabilities was a claim held by appellant for $24,198.62 in the
form of five promissory notes. Neither corporation at any time furnished
any collateral for this indebtedness, or paid any part of same. Receivers
were subsequently appointed for both corporations.
At the time of the insolvency of X corporation, the total amount of
appellant's claim, including interest and attorney's fees, was $33,732.34.
Appellant filed a verified claim with the receiver of X corporation for
this amount.
One S, an officer of Y corporation, had prior to his death created a
trust in favor of appellant in certain insurance policies on his own life.
*Bobrick v. Second Nat. Bank of Hoboken (1916), 162 N. Y. S. 147.
T
lron Co. -v. Brown (1874), 63 Me. 139; Munroe v. Bordier (1849), 8 C. B.
862, 137 Engl. Repr. 747; Bergstrom v. Ritz-Carlton Restaurant & Hotel Co.
(1916), 157 X. Y. S. 959.
$Butts v. Dean (1840), 2 Metc. (Mass.) 76; Duncan v. Kimball (1865), 3
Wall. (U. S.) 37, 18 L. Ed. 50; Briggs v. Holmes (1888), 118 Pa. St. 283, 4 Am. St.
Rep. 597. See Nixon v. Beard (1887), 111 Ind. 137, 12 N. E. 131.
9Sec. 28, Negotiable Instruments Law, 1926 Burns, Sec. 11387.
